According to Golden Finance, Hyperliquid's joint venture at X responded to concerns that "the Hyperliquid agreement may suffer significant losses due to market manipulation": Hyperliquid's margin design strictly ensures the platform's solvency through mathematical mechanisms. The losses of HLP are always limited to its own vault, and the protocol operation never depends on HLP - this feature existed before the JELLYJELLY event. The newly added protection mechanism after the event only optimizes the loss resistance of HLP in fallback clearing, and the underlying architecture of the protocol has not changed. In the recent JELLYJELLY incident, an attacker attempted to manipulate HLP (Liquidity Provider Pool) by establishing huge long and short positions on himself. While the open contract cap at that time allowed the establishment of a position worth USDC when trading, the logical loophole was that HLP used its full fund balance to provide collateral for the liquidation. It should be clarified that the platform itself does not have solvency risks, but HLP does face excessive risk exposure due to market manipulation. Currently, the HLP liquidation component vault has set a mortgage limit, and potential losses are limited through the backup liquidation mechanism. Hyperliquid still maintains the original operating mechanism, and handles positions with insufficient mortgages in the following order: 1) Market liquidation 2) Backup liquidation 3) Automatic deleveraging (ADL). The current backup liquidation of HLP has added a protection mechanism, which sets a loss limit, so that the attack cost of manipulating the mark price is much higher than the limited benefits it can obtain from HLP.