Preface

solana has been around for five years, among which Jito (the leader in MEV infrastructure on solana) has developed for less than three years, but its market share has rapidly grown from the initial 15% to the current 95%. It can be said that most Meme transactions on Solana have to go through him!

The whole process is not wide. Please put on the bench and click on the collection. Let the fourteen kings' deep underlying principles gradually reveal:

What is Jito-solana? Why can he occupy the market in two years?

Solana compares the differences in core mechanisms of Ethereum.

Why are your transactions always being clipped?

How will Solana develop the future MEV pattern?

1. What is Jito-solana?

Of course, it is not only Jito-solana (the leader in 95% market share) that does mev infrastructure on Solana, but also other manufacturers with different entry points. This article will be based on the development history and technical principles of the core leaders, and will comment on the advantages and disadvantages and entry points of these companies in the future.

1.1. Jito's development timeline

First of all, let's use the timeline to see the magic of his market share development speed. Please pay attention to the pledge rate and related partners. It was established at the end of 21st

was launched on the Solana main network in June 222. In September of the same year, there were 200 validators, covering 15% of the pledge volume

22-23 years, financing + iteration + cooperation with Solana foundation, Jito client was included in the official recommendation

23 years, pledging Jito received MEV income bonus, forming a pledge re-pled model.

Q1, 24, 2024, due to strong community opposition, the channel for jito-solana to send transactions to jito-blockengine was closed.

In Q2 24, more than 500 validators have cooperated with each other, covering 70% of Solana's MEV, and processed 3 billion transactions in Q1 24. In Q1 25, the pledge coverage rate has reached 94.71%. Today, the importance of cross-chain bridges is still self-evident.

[Photo source: https://www.jito.network/zh/stats/]

So, it can be said that Jito is the leader in infrastructure in the MEV ecosystem on solana, and he has been developing in the past three years.

A solid support base for solana verifiers has been established, allowing most transactions to pass through the jito system. It was his system diversion that caused solana's downtime to plummet, it was him who gave the clips high profits, and it also allowed the solana's validators to increase the MEV returns by an additional 30% and steadily.

It was him who changed from the original dragon-slaying warrior to the evil dragon, and he jumped repeatedly between the warrior and the evil dragon, sometimes ferocious and sometimes kind.

In today's mainstream Meme narrative in the market, it has become a two-way player.

1.2. What kind of system has Jito built?

He actually has three core services, block-engine, jito-solana, and jito-relayer. The relationship between them is as follows:

[Photo source: Homemade by the Fourteen Lords]

First is block-engine, which is an auction system.

The typical scenario is that the clips can submit transactions in a fixed order of less than 5 transactions through a Bundle package composed of multiple transactions and conduct auctions. The validators can be sent an additional transaction called Tips as an additional tip, so that the validators are willing to give priority to the Bundle package.

Other scenarios include dex platforms such as okx, gmgn, and bn wallet. In order to avoid users being clipped, you can add tips to users' transactions and take the auction route, so as to reach the end point of the transaction chain faster.

The second is jito-solana, which is a set of clients that replace verifiers to verify transactions and generate blocks.

Its core function is to allow verifiers to receive the Bundle package sent by block-engine, so as to prioritize the construction of the transaction sequence of the transaction. At its peak, the number of Bundles processed every day can reach 2500W (recently 1000W), and every transaction is almost profitable.

The final tips fee here is delivered to the unified account, which will be 95-97% for the verification person, and 3-5% for the jito itself.

The one that is controversial is jito-relayer, which can be understood as the gateway of the verifier, used to receive transactions.

In the initial stage, when this relayer receives the transaction, it will delay by 200ms and then give it to jito-solana. If the synchronization does not delay, the transaction will be given to the block-engine. Obviously, this is selling order data. Therefore, the earliest rise of jito was caused by the interest rate spreads caused by this user.

It should be noted that in March 2024, this rule officially promoted no longer transmit data, but to this day, this forwarding switch and 200ms delay setting items can still be found in jito-relayer.

So, does verifiers sell user data nowadays? All are with blockengiNe's closed source is not open and unknown.

1.3. How much money does the Jito system make?

Obviously, the interest rate spread between this trading clip and the non-clip will be accompanied by the introduction of the tips mechanism and eventually the verifier, which has caused the current situation of his market share to soar. Who would refuse to make an extra 30% profit?

So the total Bundles initiated in the past year have reached 4.3 billion, and the total Tips costs generated in them have reached 5.51 million SOLs. Based on the market price of 140, the total revenue of jito infrastructure has reached 7.7 billion US dollars.

[Photo source: https://explorer.jito.wtf/]

However, not all of them are the benefits to the provider of Jito, the system. As mentioned earlier, there is a platform sharing of 3-5% between jito and the verifier, so in fact, the profit of jito itself is about 20-27W SOLs in the past year, that is, about 3,500W US dollars.

It can only match the two-day income of Honor of Kings, it doesn’t seem to be high? In fact, it is not necessarily true, because this is real platform income after all, and most industries in the web3 field cannot say specific revenue.

He has achieved oligarchy exclusiveness, with the exclusivity of other competitors (after all, validators can only run one client), and the profit is due to the recent weakness of memes, if solana is long-term, it will be mined for more trading scenarios.

Even in the long run, the platform adjusted its profit distribution from 3-5% to 30% (this is actually a common platform fee rate after Internet applications occupy the market exclusively).

Then you can give a very high PE estimate. Based on the 30PE of the leading web2 industry, the valuation can reach 1 billion, and based on the valuation of common web3 as expected monopoly and potential industry growth of 300 times, the valuation can reach 10 billion. For a similar estimation method, refer to "Super Agency or Business Wizard"? Let's look at the leader of cross-chain bridge. The year after LayerZero from V1 to V2"

However, today we are not trying to sort out such a macro conclusion, nor are we just relying on fantasyto understand him with virtual valuation. Instead, we hope to go deeper into details, understand its deeper principles, and analyze the future development of the market.

1.4. What demand scenarios can jito support?

This topic is actually what types of MEV attacks are currently

The most common one is the Frontrunning type, such as:

Arbitrage, like Ethereum, it is risk-free to move bricks.

Sandwitch Attack, a typical sandwich attack, the sandwich profit on SOL is about 2 dollars per piece.

JIT - Just in time liquidity, provides immediate liquidity operations.

Another category is Backrun trailing type:

refers to inserting arbitrage transactions after target transactions (such as large-scale DEX transactions, clearing events) and using the market fluctuations caused by target transactions. The specific scenario is:

DEX arbitrage: You can understand that any transaction will cause direct interest rate spreads for different dexes. Then follow it and smooth the interest rate spread.

Liquidation Following: After the user's collateral is liquidated, the trailing transaction acquires assets at a discounted price and resells them.

Origin: oracle delay: before the oracle updates the price, performs reverse operations based on the outdated price.

In addition to obvious attack scenarios, other acceleration scenarios are suitable for jito, so objectively speaking, it cannot be said that jito is only for mev, but for all scenarios with the need for acceleration and batch trading bundling.

For example, the lively opening activities on Solana, in fact, the dealer will use the Bundle bundling mechanism and acceleration mechanism to open the market + deploy chips and other operations.

For example, major exchanges can actually avoid being attacked by bundling tips to users with large-scale transactions. But be aware that these cannot actually stop the verifier from doing evil (actuallyYou can't tell which verifier is doing the evil).

2. Deeply penetrate the system differences between Solana and ETH

Why is Jito so suitable for Solana?

Why is there no long flush competition in this market like ETH?

We need to start from the system differences between the two. You may have heard the POH consensus many times, but in fact, Solana's trading life cycle is different from eth, which also creates a completely different ecology between the two.

2.1. ETH's MEV pattern

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Ethereum merger 2 years ago, the author systematically analyzed: "MEV pattern one year after Ethereum merger"

It can be clearly seen that the system life cycle of Ethereum is very clear:

[Photo source: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/IepFvVpIxLpkXV5qgF68Rw]

This is due to the fact that two very important points for MEVs have emerged after the merger:

1. The blocking interval of Ethereum has become stable. It is no longer a relatively discrete random situation in the previous 3-30S, which is half the advantage and half of the disadvantage for MEVs. Although Searcher does not need to rush to see slightly profitable transactions and send them out directly, it can continue to accumulate a better total transaction sequence and submit it to the validator before the block is released, but it also intensifies the competition among Searchers.

2. Miner incentives are reduced. This prompted validators to be more willing to accept MEV transaction auctions, which allowed MEV to reach a market share of 90% in just February-March.

So there are characters such as Searcher, Builder, Relay, Proposer, and Validator before and after.

Each block life cycle is:

The builder subscribes from the user, searcher, or other (private or public)Single stream receiving transaction creates a block

Builder submits the block to the relay (that is, there are multiple builders)

Relay verifies the validity of the block and calculates the amount it should pay to the block maker

Relay sends the transaction sequence package and the return price (also an auction bid) to the block maker of the current slot.

Block makers evaluate all bids they receive and choose the sequence package that will be the highest profit for themselves

Block makers evaluate all bids they receive and choose the sequence package that will be the highest profit for themselves

The block maker sends this signed title back to the relay (that is, the auction is completed)

After publishing the block, the reward is allocated to the builder and proposer through transactions and block rewards within the block.

So, the author believes that Ethereum's MEV must be a situation where there is a high internal competition between Searchers and Builders.

The actual data is the same: the overall yield has dropped significantly by 62%.

The year before the merger, the average profit was calculated from MEV-Explore (the ended before the merger in September 2021, and the numerical merger included Arbitrage and liquidation modes)

One ​​year after the merger, the average profit was calculated from Eigenphi was 8.3MU/M (starting from December 2022 to the end of September 2023, and the numerical merger Arbitrage and Sandwich modes)

Of course, do you think that is not the MEV-boost on ETH grows faster? really!

But fast growth does not mean high profits? We have just analyzed the profits, and the rapid growth of Ethereum is the fact that the miner incentives are reduced, which prompts validators to be more willing to accept MEV transaction auctions, so that they can reach a market share of 90% in just February and March

[Photo source: https://mevboost.pics/】

And the most different thing in ETH and Solana is that there are many builders, and their different final returns affect the decisions of validators, thus forming competition among builders.

Because of competition, the searcher's profits are constantly compressed. Because of competition, the only thing that affects the builder is the amount of data.

Searchers that cannot compete will exit the market, while builders that can obtain a large amount of data often have their own infrastructure and market reputation to form a stable total order flow, rather than relying on the spread of mempools between nodes.

This will lead to the fact that ETH's MEV market is actually more market-oriented than pure oligopolitical platform systems like Solana, which can relatively give users some breathing.

2.2. Solana's block mechanism

After understanding the ETH system, please clear your mind, because many places in Solana are different from Ethereum, and even traditional blocks are different.

It is these mechanisms that bring about the root cause of the rampant mev in the Solana system.

We can use a table to quickly compare these 4 core features

The key is the two characteristics of no memory pool and direct connection leader. The former brings transaction delays. The latter brings validators to commit evil.

2.2.1. Solana actually has no memory pool

The 200ms delay of jito and the synchronization pass to blockengine we mentioned earlier are actually a monetized memory pool. Then objectively speaking, it does not have a memory pool mechanism (this is actually an optimization function of Solana's speed-up and privacy protection), how will it affect the transaction blocking mechanism?

If you are an ordinary user and initiate a transaction,Given to a certain node, it is equivalent to broadcasting.

So under the default configuration, this node will immediately look for the current leader and the next leader (total 2 validators) and submit your transaction.

As for where the transaction order will be? This point needs to distinguish between native Solana and jito-solana:

Native Solana: After the leader gets the transaction, it will theoretically follow FIFO (first-in, first-out) who will come to my leader first, then I will include it in the transaction sequence. Combined with the POH mechanism, it is equivalent to dividing a block into a large number of small ticks for synchronization.

Jito-Solana: There is a queue to calculate the current gaslimit in the leader (called CU in the SVM system, computing resources), and its weight is lower than that of the Bundle, so ordinary transactions will be behind the Bundle transaction. If it is the same transaction (if someone attacks you), Jito-Solana will prioritize the number of transactions that attack you. Here he gives 80% to Bundle, while only 20% to traditional ordinary transactions.

So, Solana has no memory pool, it just reduces public passes, rather than completely eliminating (unable) passes.

This feature in turn makes Searcher on Solana exclusive to high-end players.

2.2.2.2. The subsequent blocked leader is predictable

verifiers will use each epoch as unit (about 2-3 days), and will continuously sample randomly from 1,300 validators during this period. The VDF algorithm is used here, and there will be a pledge right weighting effect.

For example, if the total pledge amount of sol is 200W, and if you pledge 20W of sol, it will cause you to have a 10% chance of being drawn in each random.

If you draw, you will be responsible for block production in the next 4 slots (the benchmarking concept of blocks in solana) for about 1.6 seconds.

This speed is very fast, so any valid node can calculate who the subsequent verifier is, and try to link with him and submit the user's transaction. Due to the delay in the network, it is easy to trade and miss the current leader and deliver it to the next leader.

2.2.3. The linked strategy of the leader also has pledge weighting

i.e. the SWQoS mechanism. The current p2p connection capacity of the leader is 2,500, of which 80% (2,000 connections) are reserved for SWQoS (that is, the nodes that have been pledged).

The remaining 20% ​​(500

It sounds confused, but it is a new mechanism to prevent spam and enhance Sybil resistance. The purpose is to allow the leader to prioritize transaction messages that are proxyed by other stake validators.

2.3. Why is Solana easy to be attacked?

In order to prevent transactions from being clipped, many ordinary users think that I can also give high Priority Fees (transaction priority fees, so that miners can package my transactions first? So that they don't get clipped? The truth is that it has a little effect, but not many, extreme situations and even counter-effects.

[Photo source: https://explorer.jito.wtf/feestats]

From the above picture, we can see that the user actually gives the probability of Priority Fees being a similar ratio, while tips are prone to fluctuations and competition, and tips are essentially a separate transaction. From the outside, we don't know which transactions are in the Bundle.

So no matter how high your priority fee is, it can only be placed in the last 20% queue of validators. However, for the searcher who can find your order at the beginning and issue a clip to attack your searcher, the average CU unit price with you with a high Priority Fees is higher.Naturally, it is more preferred in the validator's Bundle consumption queue and broadcast synchronization.

Similarly, other Solana mechanisms are scattered at first glance, which are beneficial to users' difficult to get clipped. So why are the clips on Solana the most rampant? There are also these key points:

leader does not make sure that evil is committed.

leader has two ABs in front and behind, and all of them can get transactions from users, so the cost and ambiguity of evil behavior of leaderB are lowered.

You think, as the second leader, I see profitable transactions, so I quickly build a clip attack to the blockengine for auction, and then under the 80% Bundle-first mechanism, my attack will naturally work, but the one that packages it is leaderA.

So how do you decide that I am leaderB is the attacker?

Of course, you can say that ultimately leaderA packs the attack transaction, so he is the attacker, but in the default logic, 95% of validators will do the same thing, so the chance of intervening with them is smaller.

Punishment of A is actually unreasonable. After all, there are other links in the middle, which may also lead to information leakage, as follows.

Trading retry, staying for a long time

Each slot is obviously only 400ms, but have you ever had any experience of staying on Solana for inexplicably for more than 23 seconds?

You may have been hasty thinking that the nodes you linked to are not performing enough, but in fact they are not.

Because there is a Swqos mechanism, if you link to an ordinary node, then it calculates and finds the leader and submits the transaction. However, when the network is crowded, it only has 500 connection pools for ordinary nodes. Once the link fails to submit, it will retry all transactions of the node in 2 seconds.

The above parameters are all the underlying default parameters of Solana nodesDifferent nodes can have different settings (such as changing to 1s to try again).

For ordinary users, how can the probability of retrying?

As of March 2025, solana currently has about 1,300 validators and 4,000 RPC nodes.

So once it is crowded, it is within 1.6s (4 slots), and 2700 nodes compete for 500 link pools. If the space of this leader is not squeezed, keep looking for the next one.

So under the illusion. How will they treat your transactions stay in nodes for a long time? If your CU price is not high enough, and the leader is full and he has seen the transaction, what should he do?

Yes, sell data. For nodes with large traffic, some searchers will buy order flow at a price of 10,000 US dollars per month.

meme narrative and pledge increase scale

First of all, meme's market stage, because the current mainstream narrative of Solana is the Meme ecosystem, the pool on the chain is very shallow, which makes it easy for users to trade slippage to set a looser setting before the transaction is completed, which amplifies the searcher's attack income (I have looked at several samples at present, and all of them can achieve a return of US$2, compared with the return of almost US$0.1, which is very high)

[Photo source: https://www.jito.network/zh/stats/]

The second is Solana's verifier pledge income, which is about 8% annualized, which is a relatively stable value for many years.

The annualized return after mev's strengthening is about 1.5%.

When the combination of the two is equal to the stakeholder running the additional jito-solana client, which can add an additional 15-30% stake yield. When the market breaks out in some cases, even the yield of mev can exceed the pledge collection.Benefit itself.

2.4. Why are Solana's verifiers prone to betrayal?

The profit is too high, and the cost is also very high, forcing validators to continue to expand their sources and increase their revenue.

Verifications have a voting cost of approximately 300-350 SOL per year (estimated at US$140 market price of US$42,000) and a hardware cost of US$4,200 (not counted as the cost of dynamic networks)

Solana's huge node configuration burden requires at least 24 cores, 256GB of memory, and 2*1.9TBNVME.

The custom Latitude models commonly used by 14% of validators are currently using them, which costs $350 per month.

Eventually, only 458 of Solana's 1,323 validators were profitable. This is why the "SIMD-0228 Proposal" will not pass the vote.

From the results, this proposal will further reduce blocking incentives, which will inevitably force smaller validators to exit. Even leading to an irreversible change in the centralization of the platform. And when the revenue of mev increases and the revenue of essential work decreases, what do you think will happen?

Let's take a look at their strategies from competitors other than Jito

3. Other competitors of MEV on Solana 3.1. Paladin: Doing VIP rush and transaction protection

The current market share: 5%, was launched at the end of 2023. As of March 2025, the official claimed that 205 validator nodes have deployed Paladin, pledged 53M SOL, and using the Paladin client can increase node revenue by about 12.5%.

In fact, it is essentially based on a forked modified version of the Jito-Solana client. The core selling point of the launch is that the P3 priority port: the leader that gives out the block opens this fast VIP channel and reprocesses it according to the original FIFO rules.

Identification and exclusion of clip attacks: While this initially seems to be unfavorable to validator rewards, Paladin validators are compensated through a trust-based mechanism. Validators who avoid "sandwiches" can attract direct transactions, creating an ecosystem of trust and increasing revenue.

Paladin Bot: This is an open source high-frequency arbitrage robot that runs directly local to the validator node and is only started when the node is elected as Leader. When Leader owns Paladin Bot, it will quickly execute simple and risk-free MEV strategies (such as pair of DEX spread arbitrage, centralized exchanges and on-chain spread arbitrage, etc.), and directly count the profits into validator returns

As of 12.3, 2024, the last bot has been officially announced to be deleted.

3.2, bloXroute: Network layer optimization + private channel guarantee

bloXroute Labs is an infrastructure company that provides blockchain data distribution network (BDN). It has previously accelerated trading broadcasting and reduced latency on chains such as Ethereum.

bloXroute does not directly participate in MEV allocation, but by providing faster access to the leads, it can help jump-start transactions reach the Leader faster.

Unlike Jito/Paladin, bloXroute does not directly modify the Solana verification client or introduce a transaction auction mechanism, but provides faster message channels for all nodes at the network layer.

Its main idea is to relay Solana's block "shred" (fragment) more quickly to all validators through a global acceleration node network, reducing the latency of data broadcasting when the Leader blocks and forking due to poor network. So the services provided are:

Solana BDN Acceleration: According to the official documentation, bloXroute Solana BDN can reduce the block fragment propagation delay by 30–50 milliseconds

MEV-Protect RPC service, similar to EthereumThe protective private transaction port shows that the bloXroute plan allows users to send transactions privately to the leader through their RPC to avoid being seen by third parties, thereby preventing forward or rushing.

3.3. BlockRazor: Network layer optimization + private channel guarantee

BlockRazor is a newly established MEV infrastructure project in 2024, and the team background behind it mainly comes from Asia. It is positioned as an intent-centered network service provider and plans to provide services such as MEV Protect RPC, high-performance network acceleration, MEV Builder on mainstream blockchains

Scutum MEV Protect RPC: This is a private transaction gateway service launched by BlockRazor, similar to Flashbots Protect. Users can submit transactions Bundle through Scutum RPC.

BlockRazor will ensure that these transactions are not published by public mempool and are sent directly to block producers to avoid being snatched or sandwiches

4. Summary 4.1. How do you view the MEV competition landscape on Solana?

Just the day before yesterday, a new competitor entered

Warlock Labs raised $8 million on March 27, 2025, aiming to reshape the on-chain order flow. However, he focuses on the Ethereum track, and plans to ensure that they are accurate and responsible for processing user transactions by further providing some proof of order flow data and registering them on the chain.

This is my point of view: a truly good market will continue to enter new competitors, but an oligopolistic market will bring about the closure of challengers, and what kind of market does the platform expect itself to become?

Let us think deeply about what is really important in this mev infrastructure?

Paladin is built on jito-solana, which means that jito can actually upgrade a version and no longer supports the so-called P3 channel. It is similar to the 3Q war back then. In the end, who needs it more urgently (Obviously social) Who wins? Similarly, WeChat bans NetEase Cloud Music and other friends from sharing. If there is no larger rule machine, then this set of exclusive competitive strategies can be used in any track without limit. Moreover, the 5% market share of paladin is also because it uses built-in bots to increase the profits of verifiers in the early days. Although its open source bots only focus on non-strong offensiveness (that is, types that obviously damage users' interests such as moving bricks, not sandwiches, etc.), it is still suppressed by market public opinion.

In addition, several other competitors, bloXroute and BlockRazor, both take the acceleration + privacy channel route. The so-called privacy limit is to provide only one leader at the moment, so as to avoid the next one doing evil and the direct strike between the two sides in the face of evil.

And acceleration capability is indeed the strong technical strength nowadays. It is also the focus of the next wallet/Dex market war.

Objectively speaking, Solana's original client code is written with some historical debts, so people once jumped out and changed the client, making the configuration lower and the synchronization faster. In addition, combined with the Swqos mechanism, being a verifier can actually improve link stability and success rate.

In addition, jito's blockengine system is actually a multi-center system, but no matter how many centers (not completely decentralized), there will be a single point of failure. Since it is the core link of the upstream, once it goes down, it will be approximately equivalent to Solana's downtime.

So to achieve multi-node disaster recovery and speed up, you still have to go through the system that once had a wave of pressure testing challenges. This is also the reason why Binance Wallet's bugs appear more, and many historical technologies have not yet been completed.

But the problem of technical hard power will eventually be solved.

Everyone can do global optimization of multi-nodes. In the end, the leader will be located on which continent, and the shortest channel will be established to allow its transactions to reach the leader quickly. It can also establish a multicast strategy to divert different user needs. The future competition results will inevitably be the result of refined operations.

But what cannot be solved is the problem of market competition crowding.

If jito-solana uses oligoIf the head advantage is to modify the Bundle priority strategy from 80% to 90%, or even 95%, then ordinary users can only infinitely increase Priority Fees to compete for the 5% CU space missed.

But here, in fact, when the total CU is insufficient, it will eventually affect the total value of the validator's return (and because a large number of transactions are piled up in the unprocessed queue, the validator's motivation to do evil will be stronger), so Jito will not start such a competitive model unless it is absolutely necessary.

So why is the market competition in ETH more open? And Solana's competition is more exclusive?

The author believes that the root cause is the lack of the role of Builder bidding.

ETH can generate multiple final block sequences by multiple Builders, and the verifier only verifies and selects which one.

But Solana only has multiple blockengines (and all of them are their own family), and the transaction queue he gave to the verifier is actually a single Bundle (5 transactions), and there are many Builder competition links here.

Objectively speaking, from the development history of ETH, it can be seen that this competition will significantly expand the profits of validators and reduce the profits of Searcher. When the profits of Searcher decrease, the attack situation will also decrease, and a balance will eventually be reached.

In the future where both technology and market are balanced, what is its true competitiveness?

The author believes that when the technology gap is smoothed with talent competition and investment, when the market ultimately affects the overall SOL ecology in centralization and decentralization, it will be solved. Now Solana has started discussions on multiple Builders, and even further started discussions on multiple leaders to further randomly generate blocks.

Although multiple leaders also means that more people will get your order, since the final block is a random one in multiple simultaneous queues, the competition for multiple Builders is achieved in disguise, and the market impact will be the same as before.

Then the real competitiveness will be converted to the number of order flowsAccording to the isolated island.

For example, jupiter has already occupied more than 80% of the dex market, so his order flow is the biggest hot commodity. It depends on how he weighs whether to provide the best price or randomly take a "lucky goose" from it to get profits, even if he loses a little brand reputation.

I think the reason why they don't end up doing their own meV infrastructure is probably because they are facing the developing market stage. No one can say that they are as majestic as traditional big factories, so focusing on profits at this time will give competitors the chance to overtake.

And mev is always a game theory problem. Once it reaches a monopoly position, then the support of the validators relying on the monopoly will push the facilities to provide profits.

Any dragon-slaying warrior seems to have unstoppable potential to become an evil dragon, and it will become a collection of evil dragons and warriors.

Of course you might say that jito was originally aimed at the infrastructure for MEVs, so how could it be the Dragon Slaying Warrior?

4.2. Jito’s merits and demerits to Solana?

A lot of the previous ones are all about jito's mistakes, so has jito been successful?

Objectively speaking, jito has made contributions.

I scoffed at Solana at that time when I started watching it three years ago (well, I admit I was too loud at that time), but the root of this analysis is that his downtime is too high.

Then why is there such a high downtime rate?

On the one hand, there were too many pitfalls in the early code, and later I found that giving money could solve most problems (the machine configuration was constantly rising).

On the other hand, it is FiFo's strategy. When there is a high-profit and profitable transaction on the chain, even if it is just a backrun attack form, then whoever follows the nearest will have a higher profit.

Obviously, every Searcher will build a set of facilities to send the fastest transaction to the leader, so early leThe ader is always attacked by floods at any time.

With the emergence of blockengine, jito further generated a bidding process. When you see the profit, you should go to the sale first, and the traffic will be diverted here.

The auction here also has a function of intercepting failed transactions, because if your transaction conflicts with others and the price of others is higher, then since the two searchers are holding transactions of the same person, it will inevitably be a conflict. So if you bid but blockengine will directly reject you, then you will raise the price again and continue to the auction (it may also randomly reject you, which will make you mistakenly think that you must bid further. OK, it is so friendly to kill old customers with big data).

Of course, you will ask back, why do we still see that there are still many failed transactions on Solana now?

Of course, because blockengine is multi-centered, and the block production speed of 400ms is so fast that it cannot achieve fast data synchronization, thereby eliminating the auction errors caused between different blockengines.

So, the author believes that jito also contributed, after all, he caused Solana's downtime to drop significantly.

In addition to the downtime, its bundled transactions also give the market a variety of application scenarios.

A market is about to be prosperous, but in fact, it is necessary to serve market makers and do things well. The Meme market that is most explosive is the Meme market, which cannot be separated from the opening group. They need to "obscurely" while launching. This is a scene of being highly sniped. If the operator of the plate cannot collect low-priced chips that are profitable enough, then he may give up pulling the market and reopen directly.

In fact, it is not good for both parties, after all, he himself is in vain.

There are other transactions that need to be accelerated, such as each dex. Now, I trust jito-solana not to sell data blatantly as before. Therefore, for high-value transactions, users will give an additional tips fee, take the blockengine fast route, and directly occupy 80% of the CU processing queue., thereby improving transaction speed and avoiding being clipped.

Enhance the income of Solana stakeholders and improve the overall decentralization level

The previous data has been analyzed. Solana's pledge income is about 8% annualized, and then through Jito's mevtip income, it can reach about 10%, which is a good space.

And only 458 of Solana's 1,323 validators are profitable, and the others are not completely unprofitable (or who else can do it). In fact, the others are either doing evil directly or indirectly or have their motivations not to make money (such as just for Swqos speedup). Essentially, the appeal statistics are based on pledge income, rather than fully incorporated into the mev income.

So it is also because of the existence of jito that the remaining 800 validators are profitable and make Solana less centralized today.

So overall, jito-solana still has made contributions. At least he has not fully adopted an exclusive competitive strategy. At this time, there is still a third-party opportunity to enter.

4.3. How will the future MEV pattern develop?

The author has mentioned several key points before. I think it seems that it is the only one in the world, but it is actually a time of opportunity lurking.

First, because the profits of MEV on Solana are generally high (about 2U, better than ETH about 0.1U), the trend of meme will be traded forever with different narrative scenarios, so new Searchers will enter. Although the higher order flow acquisition cost on Solana blocks some small players, the competition among large players will also increase investment with profits.

Secondly, there are a lot of opposition on Solana, competing with MEV infrastructure. This forced Jito to announce the closure of the channel for selling data, and also forced Paladin to delete the built-in bot functionality. Among proposals like simd-228, there are also proposals that have been passed.

The rewards that the verifiers receive will be destroyed, but now only bHalf of the ase Fee will be destroyed. This has improved the profits of validators in packaging normal user transactions in disguise, thereby increasing their motivation to combat Jito's reduction of the weight of ordinary transactions. There are constantly new proposals participating in Solana's macro decision-making game. Third, mev's overall profit margin is large enough. For example, last year, Jito Labs's expense revenue in October was $78.92 million, twice the record of $39.45 million in May, and higher than the old DeFi protocols such as Lido and Uniswap. Even if Jito itself wants to distribute dividends to the verifier, the overall interest rate spread is the lower limit of the user's loss scale.

The greater the loss, the greater the motivation there is, and users' expectations for reliable services can also be quantified from it. That is the opportunity for BlockRazor and bloXroute.

And what I still expect is some more cutting-edge explorations:

From the privacy transaction: Threshold encryption, Delayed Encryption, and SGX encryption, basically all require the decryption conditions from encrypted transaction information, or the mode of time locking, multiple signing or trusted hardware

From the fair transaction: MEV Auction with fair sorting, FSS and order flow auction And MEV-Share, Mev-Blocker, etc., the difference is from no profit to sharing profits to weighing profits, that is, the user decides what kind of cost to obtain the relative fairness of the transaction.

Protocol-level improvement of PBS. Currently, PBS is actually a proposal from the Ethereum Foundation, but it has achieved separation with the help of MEV-boost. In the future, such a core mechanism will be converted into Ethereum's own protocol mechanism.

Most of the here have been proposed in Ethereum itself, but the compatibility differences have not yet emerged from users' vision, but these are also places where Solana itself can also learn from it.

5. The end of the competition is often not surpassed by the efforts of the same track. The one who kills jito will not be the next jito (he has made achievements and demerits), but a completely new form of application.

In my previous study "[Interpretation of UniswapX Protocol]", the author summarized the profit source of UniswapX's operating process, and wanted to fully characterize the specific yield of MEV. After all, this is the source of what he fought against and distributed dividends to users (essentially, it loses the real-time nature of the transaction but exchanges for a better exchange price).

Similarly, exchanges in the form of order book (even decentralized exchanges) are also good tools to fight MEV. You can think that when the computing power is further improved in the future and daily trading is further expanded, the AMM mechanism and the corresponding maximum attack scenario of MEV attacks will also disappear. But the other challenges that order books have to face are no less than MEV problems.

From the recent twists and turns of hyperliquid, we can see that put aside the hidden worries of centralization, on the overall journey of web3 to comply with regulations, players at the card table have already changed into suits and entered the international synagogue.

At this time, compliance is a sword in all aspects, after all, he is on the side of the user at this time.

This article is full of ten thousand words in scale, and logic and data are inseparable from the cross-recruitment of the following articles. Thank you for the research provided for industry development!